The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in studies on the development, function and evolution of asymmetries in vertebrates, including amphibians. Here we discuss current knowledge of behavioral and anatomical asymmetries in amphibians. Behavioral laterality in the response of both adult and larval anurans to presumed predators and competitors is strong and may be related, respectively, to laterality in the telencephalon of adults and the Mauthner neurons of tadpoles. These behavior lateralities, however, do not seem to correlate with visceral (...) asymmetries in the same animals. We briefly compare what is known about the evolution and development of asymmetry in the structure and function of amphibians with what is known about asymmetries in other chordate and non‐chordate groups. Available data suggest that the majority of asymmetries in amphibians fall into two independent groups: (1) related to situs viscerum and (2) of a neurobehavioral nature. We find little evidence linking these two groups, which implies different developmental regulatory pathways and independent evolutionary histories for visceral and telencephalic lateralizations. Studies of animals other than standard model species are essential to test hypotheses about the evolution of laterality in amphibians and other chordates. BioEssays 26:512–522, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Study of Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa of Śaśadhara, treatise on Nyaya philosophy; includes Sanskrit text with English translation.

In conveying experiences of meditation, the question of what exceeds or should resist description has been a recurrent topic of commentary in a wide array of literature -- including religious doctrine, meditation guides, and contextual accounts written by historians and social scientists. Yet, to date, this question has not significantly informed neuroscientific studies on the effects of meditation on brain and behaviour, in large part -- but not wholly -- because of the disregard for first-person accounts of experience that still (...) characterizes neuroscience in general. By juxtaposing perspectives from non-neuroscientific accounts on the tensions and questions raised by what is and is not expressed or expressible in words, this article paves the way for a new set of possibilities in experimental contemplative neuroscience. (shrink)

The liberal and democratic political order is underpinned by universal principles of justice. However, the universality of these principles is now being questioned and undermined by challenges from postmodernism, communitarianism, multiculturalism and other forms of anti-foundationalism. These challenges highlight the sheer diversity of cultures and values, treating liberal values and democratic political culture as one idea of social organization amongst many. While social and political orders are capable of almost endless variation, it may be that not every diverse order is (...) legitimate and we can justifiably regard some forms of social organization as beyond the pale and a 'thin' form of universalism has been developed to support this contention. The core idea behind 'thin universalism' is that it is possible to rehabilitate the universalist aspirations of normative theory while acknowledging the force of many antifoundationalist and multiculturalist criticisms of universalism. This book brings together prominent international political theorists to explain and discuss this contested concept and explore how we can stand up for and act upon principles in a world characterized by cultural difference, moral skepticism, and political division. The authors present a variety of perspectives: some chapters are sympathetic to the idea of a thin universalist account of justification, some are reluctant advocates and others are skeptical about its success or even desirability. Opening out core debates in contemporary normative theory, this volume will be of great interest to researchers and scholars working in the fields of contemporary political theory, political philosophy and IR theory. (shrink)

The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ' demarcation problem', is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the philosophy of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles that we can use in distinguishing between science and non-science, particular (...) judgments and decisions about something's scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. (shrink)